What Can Brown Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause by Karlan, Pamela S.




WHAT CAN BROWN® DO FOR YOU?: 
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This is a story about two of the most influential texts in 
American constitutional law. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education1 striking down de jure segregation of 
public schools, has become the most revered opinion in the Court’s 
history—the most “super-duper,” to use Senator Arlen Specter’s 
phrase,2 of all the Court’s precedents. The second, Professor Herbert 
Wechsler’s Harvard Law Review article, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law,3 has become the second-most-cited law review 
article in American history.4 The final pages of Neutral Principles are 
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 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Senator Specter used this phrase to refer to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), during 
the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts, in light of the Court’s having had numerous 
opportunities to overrule it. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, 
Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 145 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/browse.html; cf. Pamela S. 
Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 543 (1999) (“Today, 
Brown v. Board of Education, which was a controversial decision in 1954 (and perhaps an 
unthinkable one in 1896), is the third rail of judicial nomination: touch it and you die.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 3. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1959). 
 4. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751, 759–60 (1996) (noting that Professor Wechsler’s article is the second most often cited 
article after R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). Brown is 
nowhere near the most often cited opinion in Supreme Court history. That distinction goes to 
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in fact devoted to arguing that Brown cannot be squared with the 
demands of principled adjudication.5 
Over time, the relationship between Brown and Neutral 
Principles has changed dramatically. If Neutral Principles were 
remembered primarily as an attack on Brown as an unprincipled 
decision, it would never have had such staying power.6 Neutral 
Principles would then be so firmly on the wrong side of history that 
citing it for the proposition that adjudication should rest on reason 
and principle would be like citing Dred Scott v. Sandford7 for the 
proposition that “when a plaintiff sues in a court of the United States, 
it is necessary that he should show, in his pleading, that the suit he 
brings is within the jurisdiction of the court.”8 
But that is not how Neutral Principles is remembered. It is 
remembered instead for its title—it may have begun the practice of 
starting articles with the word “toward” (which suggests in a falsely 
modest way that the author is not quite getting all the way there)—
and for its general statement of the features that make judicial review 
legitimate in a democracy.9 Its analysis of the decision in Brown has 
largely been forgotten.10 And precisely because the tension between 
 
the otherwise forgettable United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906), a 
citation to which appears at the top of the slip copy of the syllabus to every Supreme Court 
opinion to remind readers that the syllabus “constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but 
has been prepared . . . for the convenience of the reader.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120 (1995) 
(alteration in original). 
 5. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 31–34. 
 6. See David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065, 
1071–73 (2008) (describing how Wechsler’s critique—although “infamous for being obtuse”—
contains the seeds of an important challenge to how courts adjudicate constitutional cases). 
 7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 8. Id. at 401–02. It is probably safer simply to quote FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a): “A pleading that 
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court’s jurisdiction . . . .” 
 9. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 16–20. 
 10. For reasons that I discuss, attention to the relationship between Brown and Neutral 
Principles was revived by the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); see also, e.g., Goodwin Liu, 
“History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARVARD L. & 
POL’Y REV. 53, 64–65 (2008) (likening Wechsler’s treatment of Brown in Neutral Principles to 
the plurality opinion in Parents Involved); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 
Term—Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 91 (2007) (“The prevailing opinion in Parents Involved is . . . clearly 
Wechslerian. Exactly like Wechsler, the prevailing opinion purported to be balanced and fair-
minded—that is what the allusion to the legacy of Brown clearly expresses. Nonetheless, like 
Wechsler, the Court ignored the asymmetry between exclusion and inclusion . . . .”). 
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Neutral Principles the article and Brown the decision has been 
forgotten, the Supreme Court treats Brown as the apotheosis of 
“neutral principles,” in particular, of a principle of race neutrality or 
colorblindness as the essence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. Neutral principles the idea, if not Neutral 
Principles the article, seems to be winning the struggle to claim 
Brown for itself. 
Brown occupies a peculiar position within constitutional 
interpretation. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have devoted 
pages upon pages of their opinions to plumbing the meaning that 
constitutional provisions possessed at the time of their framing and 
ratification.11 Although the contemporary fixation on originalism 
arose from conservative resistance to decisions by the Warren and 
Burger Courts,12 professed fidelity to some form of “original 
meaning” or “original understanding” now seems firmly in the 
ascendancy. For instance, Professor Jack Balkin has sought to show 
how constitutional protection of a woman’s ability to terminate her 
pregnancy is consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,13 and Douglas Kendall has founded a progressive think 
tank devoted to “honest textualism and principled originalism.”14 But 
 
 11. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789–804 (2008) (discussing the 
original understanding of the language contained in the Second Amendment); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244–51 (2008) (discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus as 
understood in 1789). Justice Thomas, in particular, has often argued for a repudiation of existing 
interpretations because they do not accord with what he sees as a constitutional provision’s 
original meaning. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “the history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as 
originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools” despite a long line of 
cases recognizing that students possess some level of constitutional protection); Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58, 58–66 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause should be returned to an eighteenth-century understanding of 
“commerce” as standing “in contrast to productive activities like manufacturing and 
agriculture”). 
 12. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335, 1347 (1997) (“Originalism is an ism, a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction 
against the Warren Court. Before Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched their attacks on 
the Warren Court, originalism as we know it did not exist.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 13. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 passim 
(2007). 
 14. See Constitutional Accountability Ctr., What Is Constitutional Accountability?, 
http://www.theusconstitution.org/page.php?id=91 (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
In a forthcoming book, Professor Goodwin Liu, Professor Christopher Schroeder and I 
argue that while the original application of constitutional provisions is one important source for 
contemporary interpretation, other sources—such as constitutional structure and development, 
changed public understanding, and the interaction of constitutional principles with current 
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whatever originalism means with respect to other constitutional 
issues, when it comes to the Equal Protection Clause and its 
application to questions of race-conscious government action, the 
Court seldom looks back beyond Brown.15 Put simply, the Court has 
abandoned “Framers’ originalism” in favor of “Brown originalism,” 
in which Justices claim fidelity, not to what the Equal Protection 
Clause meant in 1868, but rather to what the Supreme Court meant in 
1954. 
Brown itself took a complex stance with respect to originalist 
interpretation. In Part I of this Essay, I explore that stance. Although 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court rejected the narrowest 
form of originalism, which asks how the framers of a constitutional 
provision would have decided a specific issue had it been posed to 
them at the time,16 it did anchor its approach in a different form of 
original understanding—one that focused on the history out of which 
the Fourteenth Amendment had emerged. I suggest that Wechsler’s 
critique of Brown lost sight of that history and accordingly failed to 
see how Brown’s commitment to racial inclusiveness reflected 
principled adjudication. 
Part II then turns to the interplay of neutrality and originalism in 
the Supreme Court’s controversial desegregation decision, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.17 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court invokes Brown but 
follows Wechsler. The Parents Involved Court took Brown to require 
a symmetrical reading of the Equal Protection Clause: all race-
conscious government action, whether it serves to segregate or to 
integrate civic institutions, is equally suspect. But in requiring this 
high level of generality, the Roberts Court, like Wechsler, has 
 
conditions—are also critical. See GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & CHRISTOPHER 
SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2009). 
 15. For an attempt to discuss the Reconstruction-era understanding of the government’s 
role in providing or encouraging racially integrated education, see Brief of Historians as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–15, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05-
915), 2006 WL 2922647. 
 16. Attorney General Meese’s 1985 address to the American Bar Association, which in 
some important ways signaled the emergence of the modern focus on originalism, called for a 
“Jurisprudence of Original Intention.” See Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address to the 
American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/resources/id.49/default.asp. Jack Balkin refers to this approach as “original expected 
application” interpretation: it “asks how people living at the time the text was adopted would 
have expected it would be applied.” Balkin, supra note 13, at 296. 
 17. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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adopted an understanding of neutral principles that fundamentally 
undermines the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to full civic 
inclusion. And it does so by claiming Brown for itself in a striking 
way—relying on a distorted version of what the litigants argued, 
rather than what the Court decided. 
I.  BROWN AND WECHSLER 
Brown involved challenges by black public school students to 
official policies mandating separate schools for black and white 
pupils.18 When the case first was argued, in October Term 1952, the 
Court found itself deeply divided.19 Aware that “a close vote would 
likely be a disaster for Court and country alike,”20 the Court set the 
cases for reargument in the next Term, asking the parties to address, 
among other things, the following three questions: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the 
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or 
did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public 
schools? 
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying 
the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it 
would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public 
schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the 
Amendment 
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power 
under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future 
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such 
segregation of its own force? 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do 
not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing 
 
 18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1954). 
 19. For two detailed accounts of this process, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 292–
312 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 582–616 (1975). 
 20. KLUGER, supra note 19, at 614. 
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the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?21 
At first blush, these questions might suggest that the Justices were 
originalists of some stripe. But the two leading accounts of the 
Justices’ deliberations show that these questions were a “pretense” 
devised by Justice Felix Frankfurter to avoid the appearance of 
stalling while the Justices tried to reach consensus.22 And far from 
relying on the results of this originalist inquiry,23 the Court’s opinion 
instead declared that 
[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws.24 
To say that the Supreme Court in Brown sidestepped how the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment acted or thought about school 
segregation, however, is not to say that the Court ignored 
contemporaneous understanding of the amendment altogether. To 
the contrary, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court explicitly 
hearkened back to its earliest decisions concerning the 
Reconstruction amendments, which had located their meaning in the 
particular history of black slavery and emancipation.25 In 1873, The 
Slaughterhouse Cases26 declared that 
no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose 
found in [the Reconstruction amendments], lying at the foundation 
of each, and without which none of them would have been even 
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and 
 
 21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953). 
 22. KLARMAN, supra note 19, at 301; KLUGER, supra note 19, at 614–16. 
 23. Justice Frankfurter’s law clerk, Alexander Bickel, had reported to him after a summer 
of reading the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment that “it is impossible to 
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to 
conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopting.” KLARMAN, 
supra note 19, at 304. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (setting out Professor Bickel’s understanding 
of the legislative history). The Court apparently agreed with this understanding. 
 24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
 25. See id. at 490 n.5. 
 26. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly 
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.27 
Thus, although the Court recognized that the Reconstruction 
amendments might be read more broadly to include, for example, 
forms of involuntary servitude beyond chattel slavery, it concluded 
that 
what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any 
fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these 
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have 
said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were 
designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the 
Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, 
as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.28 
Similarly, the passage from Strauder v. West Virginia29 on which Chief 
Justice Warren relied stated that “[t]he words of the [Fourteenth 
A]mendment” were directed at “discriminations” against black 
individuals, which the Strauder Court described as “steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”30 Put in 
contemporary terms, the first opinions construing the Fourteenth 
Amendment had treated it as a prohibition on racial subordination 
and had recognized its aspiration that blacks become full members of 
civic society. 
It was in light of that understanding that the Court turned to the 
constitutionality of public school segregation.31 To separate black 
school children “from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race,” the Court declared, “generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”32 Precisely 
because “the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
 
 27. Id. at 71. 
 28. Id. at 72. 
 29. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 30. Id. at 307–08. 
 31. Professor Klarman’s discussion of the Court’s internal discussion confirms this point. 
See KLARMAN, supra note 19, at 302 (noting that Chief Justice Warren opened the discussion by 
stating that the Court could uphold segregation “only” on the premise, rejected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “that the Negro race is inferior”). 
 32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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denoting the inferiority of the negro group,”33 segregated educational 
facilities “are inherently unequal” and violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.34 
As I read Brown, the evil at which the decision was directed was 
not an arbitrary or irrelevant use of race to separate similar children 
from one another—as would have been the case had a school system 
assigned children to different schools on the basis of astrological signs 
or blood type.35 Rather, the problem was an invidious use of race: 
school segregation reinforced blacks’ subordinate status and 
perpetuated the exclusion from mainstream institutions that dated 
back to the time of slavery. 
So it is something of a puzzle to then read Professor Wechsler’s 
account of Brown in Neutral Principles. Wechsler sought to enter two 
ongoing debates, one over the legitimacy of judicial review and the 
nature of principled adjudication and the other over the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions, particularly in the school segregation cases. 
Wechsler’s starting point, set out near the beginning of his article, is 
that courts function solely as an (illegitimate) “naked power organ” 
when they decide cases based on the identity of the parties before 
them.36 Thus, Wechsler condemns the person who “disapproves of a 
[judicial] decision when all he knows is that it has sustained a claim 
put forward by a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a 
segregationist, a corporation or a Communist.”37 To be sure, Wechsler 
is making an important point: in a wide variety of cases, the identity 
of the litigant should not matter. It is hard to imagine a justification, 
for example, for denying compensatory damages to plaintiffs in 
medical malpractice cases because they are segregationists or 
Communists.38 But there is also a wide array of cases in which the 
 
 33. Id. (quoting a lower court opinion). 
 34. Id. at 495. 
 35. The canonical citation for the proposition that racial classifications are constitutionally 
suspect is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Although the Court cited 
Korematsu in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“Classifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”), in which it struck down racial segregation of public schools in the 
District of Columbia as a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, it did not 
cite Korematsu or discuss what has come to be known as the anticlassification principle in 
Brown itself. 
 36. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 12. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Cf. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991) (reviewing a wrongful death case 
involving a Jehovah’s Witness in which the defendant essentially argued that the victim’s 
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identity of a litigant or injured party does matter. The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, recommend that judges take into 
account whether a victim is vulnerable or was selected because of the 
victim’s race, religion, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual 
orientation,39 and sentencing courts often take into account a 
defendant’s age when deciding an appropriate sentence.40 Sometimes, 
the litigant’s identity is the hinge on which the entire case turns. For 
example, statutes such as Title VII,41 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act,42 and the Civil Service Reform Act43 reject the 
doctrine of at-will employment entirely on the basis of an employee’s 
status. They treat decisions to hire, fire, or promote employees on the 
basis of their race, sex, political beliefs, or age44 differently from 
decisions to take personnel actions on the basis of employees’ 
performances or even such irrelevant factors as their choice of college 
football team to support.45 
Wechsler treats the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown as one 
preferring the claims of blacks over the claims of segregationists 
because of the identity of the litigants. He rejects the idea that “racial 
segregation” can be, “in principle, a denial of equality to the minority 
 
religion should preclude her executor from recovering). 
 39. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2007) (“Hate Crime 
Motivation or Vulnerable Victim”). Indeed, many hate-crime statutes turn on the identity of the 
victim. 
 40. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 593 (2007) (discussing the district court’s 
decision in setting the defendant’s sentence to take into account, among other things, “his age at 
the time of the offense conduct” (quoting Joint Appendix at 117, Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (No. 06-
7949), 2007 WL 3071558)). 
 41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 42. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 43. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 44. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) (providing that federal employees should be evaluated 
“without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, 
age, or handicapping condition”); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting discrimination against workers 
on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
sex, or national origin). 
 45. Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits denial of the right to vote “on 
account of race,” turns entirely on whether the challenged disenfranchisement was because of 
the plaintiff’s race. If the plaintiff was excluded for some other reason, the amendment is not 
implicated. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1959) (responding to Wechsler’s criticism of the 
White Primary Cases, in which Wechsler asks whether their rationale would prevent a 
religiously based party from excluding nonbelievers by pointing out that “the fifteenth 
amendment speaks only to racial distinctions”). 
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against whom it is directed[,] that is, the group that is not dominant 
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved,”46 
because he forgets that that is the principle embodied in the Equal 
Protection Clause. Because of his insistence on a kind of formal 
symmetry, Wechsler denies that racial nonsubordination can be a 
principle. How, he asks, can racial nonsubordination be a neutral 
value?47 
In one sense, I do not understand Wechsler’s problem. As 
Professor John Hart Ely later remarked, “there are neutral principles 
of every hue. (How about ‘No racial segregation, ever?’).”48 But one 
need not even go that far. To be sure, saying that the Constitution 
forbids creating racial out-groups is not neutral with respect to race: it 
treats differentiation among individuals on the basis of race 
differently from differentiation based on other factors, such as talent 
or ability to pay. In that sense, as then-Professor Louis Pollak 
explained in one of the first responses to Wechsler’s article, the 
decisive constitutional principle underlying Brown is “in a vital sense 
not neutral.”49 But that nonneutrality is a product of constitutional 
choices—most explicitly in the Fifteenth Amendment, but implicitly 
in the Fourteenth as well—rather than judicial willfulness or will. The 
Reconstruction amendments were “fashioned to one major end,” 
namely, “the full emancipation” of black Americans.50 Still, within the 
category of racial groups, a nonsubordination principle can be 
neutral, even in Wechsler’s terms: the government can be prohibited 
from treating any racially defined group as subordinate or inferior. As 
a matter of American history, blacks have been the primary 
beneficiaries of the nonsubordination principle, but that position is 
entirely contingent: the Equal Protection Clause also protects 
Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans against 
discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry.51 
 
 46. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 33. 
 47. Wechsler argues that the position that “racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of 
equality to the minority against whom it is directed . . . . presents problems” because, among 
other things, “is there not a point in Plessy” that that is just the construction that minorities 
choose to put on it? Id. 
 48. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 55 
(1980); see also Strauss, supra note 6, at 1070–71 (arguing that Wechsler was incorrect in 
claiming that Brown could not be justified with neutral principles). 
 49. Pollak, supra note 45, at 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (stating that “[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’—that is, 
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Because Wechsler thought nonsubordination could not serve as a 
neutral principle, he found himself casting around for some other 
principle that could apply to the injury suffered by black persons 
subjected to Jim Crow, and he latched onto the idea that the problem 
with segregation was not that it discriminates against black people but 
that it denies all people the right to associate across racial lines. His 
embrace of the right to associate as the core value at issue in Brown 
produced perhaps the most notorious passage in Neutral Principles: 
I think, and I hope not without foundation, that the Southern white 
also pays heavily for segregation, not only in the sense of guilt that 
he must carry but also in the benefits he is denied. In the days when 
I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a litigation in the Supreme 
Court, before the present building was constructed, he did not suffer 
more than I in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch 
together during the recess.52 
To paraphrase Professor Charles Black’s masterful 1960 response to 
Wechsler, here is where the curves of self-satisfaction and obtuseness 
“intersect at their respective maxima.”53 Like Professor Black, “I 
think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of 
philosophers – that of laughter.”54 
Only because Wechsler identified the relevant constitutional 
principle as a right of association was he confronted with the problem 
he found himself unable to solve: finding a principled way for courts 
to choose between those who wished to associate (that is, black 
schoolchildren seeking to attend white schools) and those who wished 
not to associate (namely, whites who found integration “unpleasant 
or repugnant.”55) If instead he had treated the central issue as one of 
equal civic status, rather than equal government accommodation of 
 
based upon differences between ‘white’ and Negro,” but also reaches discrimination against 
Mexican Americans); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640–44 (1948) (holding that 
California’s Alien Land Law denied equal protection to citizens of Japanese descent by making 
it harder for them to own land than it was for individuals whose parents were “American, 
Russian, Chinese, or English”). 
 52. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34. For stinging recent exegesis of this passage, see Liu, 
supra note 10, at 64–65; Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 28–30. 
 53. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 
422 n.8 (1960) (stating that “[t]he curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at their respective 
maxima” in the statement that if segregation communicates a belief in black inferiority this is 
“solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896))). 
 54. Id. at 424. 
 55. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34. 
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individual preference, Wechsler would have had no real difficulty in 
deciding that whites’ desire to subordinate blacks and blacks’ desires 
for equality were constitutionally different from one another. 
But whether or not Brown was principled in the sense that 
Wechsler used that term in Neutral Principles, the decision marks the 
Supreme Court’s greatest triumph. It transformed equal protection 
from what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes derisively once called the 
“usual last resort of constitutional arguments”56 into a bedrock 
principle of constitutional law. Not for nothing did the Court later 
choose the Equal Protection Clause as its vehicle for remaking the 
American political system in the reapportionment cases or as the 
justification for resolving the presidential election of 2000.57 Precisely 
because Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States 
Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A 
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in 
Brown—the condemnation of de jure Jim Crow—is a constitutional 
theory without traction. Even Robert Bork, whose judicial 
nomination foundered in no small part because of his article Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems58—an homage in 
important ways to Wechsler’s argument—has noted that any 
constitutional “theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of 
psychological fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in 
Brown.”59 
II.  SHADES OF BROWN: THE ROBERTS COURT  
AND PARENTS INVOLVED 
The imperative of keeping faith with Brown is all the more 
pressing when it comes to cases involving school desegregation. So 
one of the most striking aspects of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision 
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 was the struggle among the Justices over what Brown meant. 
The policies at issue in Parents Involved were promulgated by elected 
 
 56. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 57. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in 
THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 159, 194–95 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001). 
 58. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1 (1971). 
 59. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 77 (1990); see also Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of 
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 passim (2000) (describing Brown’s apotheosis). 
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local school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, 
Kentucky.60 To produce racially integrated schools in the face of 
continued residential segregation, each school board took race into 
account in some pupil assignments.61 The Supreme Court, by a 5–4 
vote, held that both policies were unconstitutional.62 
Before Parents Involved, the Court had not given plenary 
consideration to the question of public school desegregation in a 
dozen years.63 That hiatus was significant because, in the interim, the 
Court had taken a fairly decisive stance on an interpretive issue 
posed, but not resolved, by the opinion in Brown: what is the central 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. In his foundational article, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,64 Professor Owen Fiss 
identified two principles that might drive interpretations of the clause: 
the “antidiscrimination principle” and the “group-disadvantaging 
principle.”65 The former principle, often referred to as an 
“anticlassification” principle,66 sees the evil to which the clause is 
addressed as the government’s classification and subsequent 
differential treatment of individuals along racial lines. It is embodied 
in the view that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must 
treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, 
religious, sexual or national class.”67 This principle calls for symmetry 
 
 60. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2824 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the policies as reflecting the view of “democratically 
elected school boards . . . as to how best to include people of all races in one America”). 
 61. Id. at 2746 (majority opinion). For details of the Seattle plan, see id. at 2746–48. For 
details of the Louisville plan, see id. at 2749–50. 
 62. Id. at 2746. 
 63. As far as I can tell, the Court’s most recent decisions had been in Missouri v. Jenkins, 
515 U.S. 70 (1995), and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Both of those cases had turned 
primarily on the question of the federal courts’ power to remedy continued racial isolation in 
the schools. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (directing that “the District Court should apply our three-
part test from Freeman v. Pitts” when “deciding whether a previously segregated district has 
achieved partially unitary status”); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491 (holding that “[a] court’s discretion 
to order the incremental withdrawal of its supervision in a school desegregation case must be 
exercised in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of its equitable power” and 
articulating three “factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court”). 
 64. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976). 
 65. Id. at 108. 
 66. E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005). 
 67. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court) (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)). 
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in the treatment of individuals. Although Wechsler might have some 
quibbles with its status as a neutral principle, it avoids, at the very 
least, Wechsler’s criticism of decisions that turn on the characteristics 
of the litigants. Under the antidiscrimination/anticlassification 
principle, all individuals enjoy identical protection against adverse 
treatment. 
By contrast, the group-disadvantaging principle, often referred to 
as an “anticaste” or “antisubordination” principle, sees the Equal 
Protection Clause as directed toward laws that perpetuate the 
historical exclusion of racial groups from full civic participation. It 
sees a “constitutional asymmetry” between government action that 
“seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of 
minority races.”68 
At the time of Brown, the Court did not need to pick between 
the two principles because both demanded the same result. 
Moreover, the doctrinal framework of equal protection analysis was 
then far less structured. Although Korematsu v. United States69 had 
held that government action resting on race-based distinctions faced 
“the most rigid scrutiny,”70 strict scrutiny as a doctrinal category did 
not emerge until the mid-1960s.71 And it was not until its decisions in 
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.72 and Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena73—both cases involving the distinctive practice of 
competitive bidding for government contracts—that the Court 
embraced the rule that all governmental uses of race were subject to 
strict scrutiny.74 So Parents Involved marked the first time that the 
Court returned to the issue in Brown—the assignment of children to 
public schools—in the context of contemporary colorblind 
constitutionalism. 
I have discussed the integration of Brown into modern equal 
protection doctrine in Parents Involved in some depth elsewhere and 
will not rehearse it here.75 Rather, I want to concentrate on how the 
Justices deployed Brown in making their arguments. 
 
 68. Id. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 69. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 70. Id. at 216. 
 71. See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After 
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1569–70 (2002). 
 72. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 73. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 74. See id. at 235; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–94. 
 75. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents 
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Like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, Brown the opinion makes only 
a very few, albeit critical, appearances in the Court’s opinion. 
Although Brown—and what the promise of Brown was—looms over 
the entire case, it is not until the antepenultimate page of the slip 
opinion announcing the judgment that the Chief Justice actually cites 
the Supreme Court’s initial 1954 decision in Brown.76 And then, in the 
course of explaining why Brown supports an anticlassification 
approach, he quotes only a fragment of a single sentence from the 
opinion. Referring to segregation, the Chief Justice writes that “[t]he 
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law.”77 The Chief 
Justice quotes that fragment, which actually involves a quotation of 
the district court’s opinion, to support his claim that “[i]t was not the 
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on 
the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional 
violation in 1954.”78 But re-placed in its context, the quotation from 
Brown shows how the Parents Involved Court posed a false choice. 
The sentence immediately preceding the quoted fragment reads, 
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children.”79 And the remainder of 
the quoted sentence itself drives this point home: “The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority 
of the negro group.”80 The vice to which the Brown Court was 
pointing was neither the provision of inferior tangible facilities nor 
the simple separation of groups. It was subordination. The reduction 
of a direct quotation from Brown to a single misleading sentence 
fragment illustrates the problem the Parents Involved Court faced in 
trying to enlist Brown in the ranks of anticlassification decisions: all of 
the ringing language in the Court’s initial opinion sounded in 
antisubordination. The Court’s attempt to support the 
 
Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts 
Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1385–91 (2008). 
 76. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007) 
(Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Somewhat earlier, the Court quotes 
from the second opinion in the Brown litigation, the remedial decision handed down a year 
later. See id. at 2765 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)). For a 
discussion of that reference, see infra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
 77. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added) (quoting a lower court opinion). 
 80. Id. 
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anticlassification principle by relying on the Court’s second opinion in 
Brown—the 1955 remedial opinion often referred to as Brown II81 is 
even more disingenuous. In concluding that “the Equal Protection 
Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’”82 Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
that 
[t]his fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown 
itself. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) 
(Brown II) (“At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in 
admission to public schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis” 
(emphasis added)).83 
But the quoted language, taken in context, was not addressing the 
nature of the plaintiffs’ rights; rather it was focusing on how to 
balance the plaintiffs’ right to attend desegregated schools “as soon as 
practicable”—the language the decision in Parents Involved omits by 
using ellipses—against the school systems’ interests in managing the 
transition to constitutional compliance.84 Whether the plaintiffs’ 
“personal interest” stems from an anticlassification principle or a 
group-disadvantaging principle is beside the point. Brown II was a 
remedial opinion. 
Given that the language in the Brown opinions provided little 
ammunition for the Court’s position, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
and Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence took another 
extraordinary step in their attempt to claim ownership of Brown: they 
relied not on what the Court said but on what counsel for the 
plaintiffs had argued. Asserting that the answer to the question 
“which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown . . . could not 
have been clearer,”85 the Chief Justice quoted from the oral argument: 
As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in 
Brown put it: “We have one fundamental contention which we will 
seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention 
is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause 
 
 81. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 82. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2765 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300. 
 85. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording 
educational opportunities among its citizens.”86 
He saw “no ambiguity in that statement”: “What do the racial 
classifications do in these cases, if not determine admission to a public 
school on a racial basis?”87 
But as Justice Holmes long ago remarked, “[a] word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought 
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.”88 The lawyer who 
made the statement on which the Chief Justice relied, Robert Carter, 
was speaking in 1952 in the context of pervasive Jim Crow, under 
which racial assignment produced racially segregated schools that had 
the purpose and effect of denying black children the educational 
opportunities the majority provided to itself. He and all the lawyers 
for the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases before the Court were 
either staff attorneys or cooperating counsel for the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a group long 
dedicated not to abstract principles of colorblindness but to full civic 
integration of black Americans.89 When Carter, who is now a 
 
 86. Id. at 2767–68 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (No. 
1)). 
 87. Id. at 2768. Justice Thomas was even more lavish in his quotations from and citations to 
the oral arguments and briefs in Brown. See id. at 2782–86 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 88. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
 89. Justice Thomas asserted the opposite: 
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection of the 
color-blind Constitution. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a color-
blind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plurality. But I am 
quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice 
Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers 
who litigated Brown. 
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Thomas cited several of 
the briefs filed in Brown as well as Judge Constance Baker Motley’s statement at the Court’s 
memorial proceedings for Justice Thurgood Marshall that the “Bible” to which Marshall had 
turned as a lawyer was Justice Harlan’s dissent. Id. But as Professor Goodwin Liu shows, 
Harlan’s view is far more nuanced than the anticlassification view propounded by Justice 
Thomas. See Liu, supra note 10, at 55–60 (proposing that Justice “Harlan’s declaration that 
‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind’ does not clearly state a categorical principle against 
classification by race” but rather means that “the Constitution does not permit government to 
validate or perpetuate a race-based system of social hierarchy”). 
And as Professor Liu also emphasizes, although Justice Harlan’s ringing phrase still has 
resonance, his dissent in Plessy is hardly a model for contemporary equal protection law. See id. 
at 54–56 (noting that Harlan “besmirched” his dissent by “attempting to underscore the 
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distinguished federal judge, was asked for his reaction to the Chief 
Justice’s reliance on his oral argument, he responded sharply: “‘All 
that race was used for at that point in time was to deny equal 
opportunity to black people,’ Judge Carter said of the 1950s. ‘It’s to 
stand that argument on its head to use race the way they use [it] 
now.’”90 
The message of Brown for the Chief Justice and his three 
conservative colleagues is a symmetrical one: “Before Brown,” the 
Court explained, “schoolchildren were told where they could and 
could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”91 As Justice 
Stevens noted in dissent, there is a troubling deracination to that 
account, which bears a startling resemblance to Wechsler’s account of 
his lunch with Charles Hamilton Houston:92 
This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he 
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep 
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” The 
 
injustice of segregation to blacks with the observation that ‘a Chinaman can ride in the same 
passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in 
Louisiana’ cannot” (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting))). And whatever the 
lawyers who litigated Brown may have thought about that one phrase from Harlan’s dissent, 
surely they would not have embraced the first three sentences of the paragraph in which it 
appears: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 90. Adam Liptak, News Analysis: The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2007, at A24. The other surviving lawyer who had argued for the schoolchildren in the 
consolidated cases “called the chief justice’s interpretation ‘preposterous.’” Id. 
As I suggest elsewhere, Judge Carter’s reaction is reminiscent of the classic scene in 
Woody Allen’s Annie Hall in which Allen’s character 
is standing in line outside a movie theater and overhears the man behind him 
spouting off about Marshall McLuhan’s views of television. [Allen] declares: “You 
don’t know anything about Marshall McLuhan’s work,” to which the man replies, 
“Really? Really? I happen to teach a class at Columbia called TV, Media and 
Culture, so I think that my insights into Mr. McLuhan, well, have a great deal of 
validity.” At that moment Woody says, “Oh, that’s funny, because I happen to have 
Mr. McLuhan right here,” and McLuhan says, “I heard, I heard what you were 
saying. You, you know nothing of my work. How you ever got to teach a course in 
anything is totally amazing.” 
Karlan, supra note 75, at 1395–96. 
 91. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court). 
 92. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34 (observing, based on the difficulty Wechsler and 
Houston, an African American, encountered when trying to have lunch in a segregated District 
of Columbia, that “the Southern white also pays heavily for segregation”). 
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Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who 
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of 
white children struggling to attend black schools.93 
For Justice Stevens, “a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny”—a 
hallmark of the anticlassification approach—“obscures Brown’s clear 
message.”94 
Although Justice Breyer’s dissent, like the Chief Justice’s 
opinion, ends with a discussion of “the hope and promise of Brown,”95 
Justice Breyer, unlike the Chief, anchored his opinion in the original 
animating concern of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than citing 
Brown itself, he cited the two cases on which the Brown Court had 
relied for its understanding that the “basic objective” of the Equal 
Protection Clause was to “bring into American society as full 
members those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery.”96 By 
looking back before Brown, Justice Breyer was able to see that 
Brown was directed at policies that did far more than simply classify 
children on the basis of skin color; “they perpetuated a caste system 
rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized 
subordination.”97 
In his written dissent, Justice Breyer then referred to Brown as 
“this Court’s finest hour” because Brown challenged and helped to 
change that history.98 Perhaps remembering Winston Churchill’s 
famous use of that phrase at the beginning of the Battle of Britain,99 
 
 93. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 94. Id. at 2799. 
 95. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 2815 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873)); see 
also id. (“[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the 
Reconstruction amendments] . . . we mean the freedom of the slave race.” (quoting The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71)); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880) 
(“[The Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common 
purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior 
race enjoy.”). 
 97. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, it was “a cruel 
distortion of history” to “equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim 
Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school 
closer to home was initially declined).” Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, Speech Before the House of Commons (June 
18, 1940), in BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS 305, 314 (1941). 
I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the 
survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long 
continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy 
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when things looked especially dark, Justice Breyer, in his oral dissent, 
elaborated, with respect to the majority’s treatment of the precedent 
since Brown, that “[i]t is not often in the law that so few have so 
quickly changed so much.”100 In Parents Involved, the majority 
claimed Brown for a tamed and minimal view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as simply a bar on race-based classifications and not a 
promise of full civic inclusion. 
*          *          * 
In the dark comedy, The Merchant of Venice, Antonio warns 
“Mark you this, Bassanio— / The devil can cite Scripture for his 
purpose.”101 Brown is, in an important sense, our national scripture. 
But in Parents Involved, the Court wrenched Brown free of its 
original context. It adopted a reading of Brown that would have been 
unrecognizable to the participants whose words it invoked, and in 
service of a vision of deracinated neutrality that Brown’s critics, and 
not its champions, had advanced. Responding to the Chief Justice’s 
invocation of Brown to support his claim that “history will be 
heard,”102 Justice Stevens trenchantly quoted back to the Chief his 
 
must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this 
Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life 
of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the 
whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared 
for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more 
protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our 
duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last 
for a thousand years, men will still say, “This was their finest hour.” 
Id. 
 100. The sentence does not appear in Justice Breyer’s written dissent, but can be heard in 
the dissent he read from the bench. Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer at 19:03, 32:54–33:03, 
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion; cf. Winston S. Churchill, The War Situation I, Speech Before 
the House of Commons (Aug. 20, 1940), in BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS, supra note 99, at 341, 
347–48. 
The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the 
world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, 
undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are 
turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in 
the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. 
Id. 
For an extensive discussion of the function of oral dissents, with particular emphasis on 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved, see Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—
Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 6, 7–13 (2008). 
 101. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act I, sc. 3. 
 102. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court). 
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dissenting statement earlier in the Term that “[i]t is a familiar adage 
that history is written by the victors.”103 If Americans are going to live 
in a world of Brown originalism, then it is at least worth remembering 
that Brown rested, not on the forms of neutrality that Herbert 
Wechsler and the Parents Involved majority embraced, but on a far 
richer vision of an integrated society. 
 
 
 103. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 
1720 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
